In discussions of the complex and controversial problem of Spartan land-tenure,1 the mysterious ‘ρχαα μορα’ has assumed an importance out of all proportion to its prominence in the sources, for the actual phrase only occurs once in extant literature. It owes its importance to the fact that the reference to it has been used to support the theory that there were two categories of land in Sparta, a theory which in turn is held to explain how, when all Spartans supposedly (...) owned equal estates, there could nevertheless be rich ones and poor ones, as authors such as Herodotos, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle make clear. The answer, it is claimed, is that although all Spartans possessed an equal share of one category of land, they could own more or less of the other category.2. (shrink)

‘Hoplites are troops who take their name from their shields’. ‘The individual infantryman took his name, hoplites, from the hoplon or shield’. Such is the orthodox view. This paper will endeavour to show that its basis is inadequate. Rather, we shall argue, hoplites took their name from their arms and armour as a whole, their hopla in that all-encompassing sense; so that the original and essential meaning of the word hoplite was nothing more than ‘armed man’.

This article offers an account of the information condition on morally valid consent in the context of sexual relations. The account is grounded in rights. It holds that a person has a sufficient amount of information to give morally valid consent if, and only if, she has all the information to which she has a claim-right. A person has a claim-right to a piece of information if, and only if, a. it concerns a deal-breaker for her; b. it does not (...) concern something that her partner has a strong interest in protecting from scrutiny, sufficient to generate a privilege-right; c.i. her partner is aware of the information to which her deal-breaker applies; or c.ii. her partner ought to be held responsible for the fact that he is not aware of the information to which her deal-breaker applies; and finally, d. she has not waived or forfeited her claim-right. Although we present this account in the context of sexual relations, we believe a virtue of the account is that it can be easily translated into other contexts. (shrink)

As the gap between the need for and supply of human organs continues to widen, the aim of securing additional sources of these “gifts of the body” has become a seemingly overriding moral imperative, one that could—and some argue, should—override the widespread ban on organ markets. As a medical practice, organ transplantation entails the inherent risk that one human being, a donor, will become little more than a means to the end of healing for another human being and that he (...) or she will come to have a purely instrumental value. With the establishment of organ markets, not only will the harms of instrumentalization be a reality—the ends of medicine will be further compromised and confused. (shrink)

Vleeskens, F. D. A. Spinoza en zijn tijd.--Klever, W. N. A. Ervaring en rede.--Petry, M. J. De Regenboog.--Bend, J. G. van der. Spinoza's liberale rechtsstaat.--Sperna Weiland, J. Vrijheid.

Background: Decisions of patients, families, and health care providers about medical care at the end of life depend on many factors, including the societal culture. A pan-European study was conducted to determine the frequency and types of end of life practices in European intensive care units , including those in Israel. Several results of the Israeli subsample were different to those of the overall sample.Objective: The objective of this article was to explore these differences and provide a possible explanation based (...) on the impact of culture on end of life decision making.Method: All adult patients admitted consecutively to three Israeli ICUs who died or underwent any limitation of life saving interventions between 1 January 1999 and 30 June 2000 were studied prospectively . These patients were compared with a similar sample taken from the larger study carried out in 37 European ICUs. Patients were followed until discharge, death, or 2 months from the decision to limit therapy. End of life decisions were prospectively organised into one of five mutually exclusive categories: cardiopulmonary resuscitation , brain death, withholding treatment, withdrawing treatment, and active shortening of the dying process . The data also included patient characteristics , specific therapies limited, and the method of SDP.Results: The majority of patients had treatment withheld, none underwent SDP, 62 received CPR , 31 had brain death , and 18 underwent withdrawal of treatment . The primary reason given for limiting treatment was that the patient was unresponsive to therapy . End of life discussions were held with 132 families , the vast majority of which revolved around withholding treatment and the remainder concerned withdrawing treatment .There was a statistically significant association between the type of end of life decision and region—that is, the northern region of Europe, the central region, the southern region, and Israel.Conclusions: Regional culture plays an important part in end of life decision making. Differences relating to end of life decision making exist between regions and these differences can often be attributed to cultural factors. Such cultures not only affect patients and their families but also the health care workers who make and carry out such decisions. (shrink)

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the (...) second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms. (shrink)

There is concern that human applications of modern genetic technologies may lead inexorably to eugenic abuse. To prevent such abuse, it is essential to have clear, formal principles as well as algorithms for distinguishing genetics from eugenics. This work identifies essential distinctions between eugenics and genetics in the implied nature of the social contract and the importance ascribed to individual welfare relative to society. Rawls's construction of 'justice as fairness' is used as a model for how a formal systems of (...) ethics can be used to proscribe eugenic practices. Rawls's synthesis can be applied to this problem if it is assumed that in the original condition all individuals are ignorant of their genetic constitution and unwilling to consent to social structures which may constrain their own potential. The principles of fairness applied to genetics requires that genetic interventions be directed at extending individual liberties and be applied to the greatest benefit of individuals with the least advantages. These principles are incompatible with negative eugenics which would further penalize those with genetic disadvantage. These principles limit positive eugenics to those practices which are designed to provide absolute benefit to those individuals with least advantage, are acceptable to its subjects, and further a system of basic equal liberties. This analysis also illustrates how simple deviations from first principles in Rawls's formulation could countenance eugenic applications of genetic technologies. (shrink)